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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
pany, Incorporated v. Vaughn.3 1 The land under lease was pooled
by order of the Commissioner of Conservation during the primary
term of the lease and no minerals were produced from the spe-
cific land or from any of the lands within the pool during the
primary term of the lease in question. The Crichton v. Lee 32 case
was distinguishable on one fact, that production from the pool
ensued during the primary term of the questioned lease, tlhough
not from the land covered by the lease. The instrument in litiga-
tion here took cognizance of the possibility of state intervention,
as it contained a provision to cover such a contingency. Because
of this clause and since the situation in principle was the same
as that of Crichton v. Lee,3 3 the court refused to cancel the lease.
No delay in beginning and continuing construction of the cycling
plant and pressure maintenance system had occurred.
A careful and conscientious survey of evidence occupied the
court in Angelloz v. Southwestern Oil & Refining Company34 in
attempting to ascertain the intention of the parties to a mineral
lease. Admission of extrinsic evidence was approved since the
wording of the document was ambiguous.
OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The most interesting case under this heading was Lakeside
Dairies v. Gregersen,' where the court affirmed a position it had
previously taken that the value of property at the date an option
to purchase is exercised rather than at the date it is originally
given is controlling for purposes of the action of lesion beyond
moiety. The option in question was contained in a lease orig-
inally made in 1942 and was exercised in 1945. The court also
took the sound view that lesion beyond moiety may be urged as
a defense to an action for specific performance brought by the
buyer. In addition to the purchase money to be paid by the
buyer, the seller was to be granted the so-called privilege of re-
buying from the buyer certain of the lots making up the entire
property. The court recognized that this was simply a condi-
tional option to be available to the vendor if and when the
vendee exercised his option and said that if the vendor should
have purchased the lots, the action of lesion would have been
31. 217 La. 459, 46 So. 2d 735 (1950).
32. 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946).
33. Ibid.
34. 215 La. 1056, 42 So. 2d 753 (1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 510, 46 So. 2d 752 (1950).
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available to the vendee. It appears that in determining the whole
price to be paid by the buyer the value of this option should
have been included. This is not to say that the value of the lots
themselves as compared with the price to be paid for them should
have been included, but simply the value of the right granted to
the seller to purchase the lots. This value, of course, would be
determined as of the time the option was granted and it may be
that even if it had been found and added to the price the result
would not have been changed. What the court said about lesion
being applicable to the purchase of the lots was of course correct.
Justice McCaleb dissented on the ground that the value of
the property should have been fixed as of the date the option
was originally granted. His position was that the earlier case of
Ronaldson and Puckett v. Bynum,2 relied on by the majority, was
decided prior to the 1910 amendment to Article 2462, providing
for the purchase of options, and that at such time options were
not known to our law. He reasoned further that the option consti-
tuted an irrevocable contract, the date of which was fixed by the
date of the lease in which the option was granted.
The view that prior to the amendment to Article 2462 options
were not known in our law, although based on an earlier state-
ment by the supreme court itself,3 is questionable. On the basis
of the resulting legal relations, the promise to sell of the French
law, repeated in Article 2462, constitutes what the common law
would call an option. The amendment to 2462 may have resulted
from a failure to appreciate this fact and from the persistent
belief that an offer must be supported by common law considera-
tion to render it irrevocable. A common law option to buy given
in a lease is a good example of a promise to sell under French
law. From this point of view, instead of the option constituting
simply an offer it amounted to a conditional contract to convey,
which gives support to the position taken by Justice McCaleb,
if not his method of distinguishing the Ronaldson and Puckett
case. Perhaps it is also true that in many instances options are
taken in view of the opportunity afforded to the buyer to acquire
the property if within the period allowed its value is enhanced,
an aleatory element. Cutting off this possibility at the point
where the enhanced value would make the price agreed upon
lesionary tends to destroy the value of what the buyer has paid
for. It may have been this was the sort of thinking that led to
the amendment of Article 2590 of the Civil Code by the 1950
2. 122 La. 687, 48 So. 152 (1908).
3. Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So. 624 (1930).
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legislature so as to provide that the immovable must be esti-
mated according to the value which it had "at the time the option
was granted if the sale be made pursuant to a valid contract of
option.' 4 This amendment would also have been in complete
accord with the holding that lesion may be urged as a defense to
an action for specific performance if the words "or demanded"
or their equivalent had been added after the word "made." But
this omission can hardly be taken as indicating a legislative inten-
tion to upset this part of the majority holding.
DiCristina v. Weiser applied again what seems to be the
court's position that in contracts for the purchase of realty the
time for the passage of the act of sale is of the essence and that
if the buyer suffers it to pass he loses his right to demand deliv-
ery. In the instant case, while the title was being examined the
time for the passage of the act of sale passed without notice by
either party. The court dismissed the buyer's action brought
thereafter for specific performance, saying that he was in default
and that being in default he could not thereafter, by virtue of
Article 1913, place the defendant in default and consequently was
not entitled to a conveyance. The court also held that the ven-
dor's attorney, not being authorized in writing, could not contract
for her for the sale of real estate and that there could be no
waiver of the time fixed for the conveyance unless in writing
because the contract itself was required to be in writing.
This case, as certain earlier cases, seems not to take into
account the authority of the court under the code to grant either
party additional time for performance notwithstanding default
if on the facts it should see fit to do so. After considerable argu-
ment the supreme court decided in Southport Mill v. Ansley
that in all contracts except completed sales of immovable prop-
erty, although the party in default is not entitled of right to
tender performance, he may be given further delay at the dis-
cretion of the judge. If, therefore, in the instant case the plaintiff
was in default by virtue of the terms of the contract, the default
would not necessarily cut off his right to a conveyance, and in
view of the facts surrounding the delay the court might well
have granted further time for performance. If it had not seen
fit to do so and if its rejection of the demand had been placed on
that ground, an approach believed to be more consistent with
the code would have been used. Furthermore, there is consid-
4. La. Act 154 of 1950.
5. 215 La. 1115, 42 So. 2d 868 (1949).
6. 160 La. 131, 106 So. 720 (1925).
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erable question whether Article 1913 has any proper legal opera-
tion other than to require that if one party desires to recover
moratory damages, or damages for delay in performance, he must
himself offer to perform when undertaking to put the other party
in default. Applied to this sort of problem, Article 1913 makes
good sense. Its indiscriminate use otherwise can be productive
of error. On the record here, if the buyer was in default, the
seller must have been also. And if the seller was in default, why
was it necessary for the buyer to put her in default? The proper
solution would seem to have been, assuming a finding by the
court that the buyer should not have been granted further time,
a dissolution of the contract including, of course, a return to the
buyer of the deposit, if made. The facts are silent about this.
The case of Red River Cotton Oil Company v. Texas and
Pacific Railway7 posed a problem of interpretation of a bill of
lading. There was ample justification for the view taken by the
majority that the carrier was still liable as an insurer rather than
as a warehouseman notwithstanding the placing of the cars in
question upon a spur track enclosed within plaintiff's yard. The
decision was put on the ground that since the free time for
unloading had not expired at the time the cars and contents were
destroyed by fire, the carrier's liability as an insurer had not
ceased. Justice Hamiter dissented, believing that a delivery into
the possession of the consignee had been made, thus absolving
the carrier of further responsibility as an insurer.
The defendant's attempt to escape responsibility on a con-
tract for the installation of an ice rink on the ground that she
signed the contract as an agent and not in her personal capacity
properly failed in Marx v. Spearman.8
The decision of the court in favor of the defendant in a peti-
tory action brought by the plaintiff was based on a counter-letter
stating that the property in question claimed by plaintiff by way
of inheritance from the record owner belonged to the defendant
and had been put in the name of decedent for convenience only.
The case was Young v. Mulroy.9 Although the plaintiff attacked
the genuineness of the counter-letter, insufficient evidence was
presented in support. On the contrary, the evidence presented
by the defendant tended to confirm her claim.
The disruption caused by the late World War also gave rise
to the case of Pacific Trading Company, Incorporated v. Louisiana
7. 216 La. 519, 44 So. 2d 101 (1949).
8. 216 La. 21, 43 So. 2d 146 (1949).
9. 216 La. 961, 45 So. 2d 357 (1950).
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State Rice Milling Company, Incorporated.0 Contracts for the
sale of rice for delivery to the buyer in this country were in-
volved. When the buyer's license was revoked and its establish-
ment sequestered by the government as the property of an enemy
alien at the outbreak of the war with Japan, the Louisiana seller
immediately notified the buyer that the contracts were cancelled.
This was sustained by the court under the common law doctrine
of frustration on the ground that the action would have been taken
by a prudent business man in view of all of the information the
seller had before it at the time indicating that the business effi-
cacy or value of the contract had been materially impaired. The
evidence showed that about twenty-four days later the plaintiff
was given a limited license. The seller's action appears to have
been somewhat hasty, but perhaps the court was correct in not
requiring too nice a degree of deliberation in view of the situa-
tion existing on and after December 7, 1941.
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Parish jurisdiction for divorce or separation. Section 301 of
Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, providing for divorce
after a two year separation in fact, states that the plaintiff "may
sue, in the courts of his or her residence within this state." In
Wreyford v. Wreyford' the plaintiff wife, described as a "resident
of Caddo Parish," filed suit in Red River Parish, in which she and
her husband had been domiciled while living together and in
which the husband was still domiciled at the time of the suit. In
the words of the court, quoted because of their extreme impor-
tance:
"The sole question before us is whether a plaintiff, whose
cause of action is predicated on the ground established by
the aforesaid act of the Legislature, must initiate his (her)
suit in the court of his (her) residence; or, whether that
plaintiff has a choice of instituting suit in the court of his
(her) residence, with the alternative choice of initiating suit
in the court of the defendant's domicile (which would be the
proper forum for a personal action) or in the court of the
matrimonial domicile (which would have jurisdiction of
the res)."
10. 215 La. 1086, 42 So. 2d 855 (1949).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 216 La. 784, 44 So. 2d 867 (1950).
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